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ncreasing tensions between Ukraine and Russia inevitably evoke memories in the 
European Union of the gas supply disruptions in January 2009. Back then, the gas dispute 
between Russia and Ukraine led to a severe drop in Russian gas supplies in the midst of a 
winter freeze, resulting in major disruptions of both domestic heating and industrial 
production, particularly in some eastern EU member states. The question today is whether 
Europe in 2014 is as vulnerable to potential (forced or voluntary) cuts in Russian gas supplies 
as it was five years ago. Two scenarios are considered here. First, could Europe sustain 
longer cuts in gas supplies from Russia, either voluntarily as part of EU sanctions or forced 
as a Russian retaliation against EU sanctions? And second, what impact would disruptions 
of Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine have on the EU, which might arise for political reasons 
and in the worst case due to war. Essentially we argue that Russia is highly dependent on 
gas exports to Europe, while Europe – at least in the medium-term – can resort to alternatives 
to Russian gas. In addition, Europe is much better prepared for potential short-term supply 
disruptions than it was five years ago. 
Replacing Russian gas: A political lever for the EU 
Regarding the exposure of the EU economy to Russian gas, about a quarter of the current EU 
energy mix is based on natural gas, mostly used in electricity production, domestic heating 
and feedstock/raw material in industrial production. Of the totality of natural gas burnt in 
the EU, nearly 23% is produced on Russian gas fields. This means that less than 6% the EU 
energy mix currently is dependent on Russian gas. In addition, the share of Russian gas in 
total EU gas imports (including LNG) has decreased slightly from 39% in 2009 to 36% in 
2012, despite growing total import dependence. The resulting market loss of Russian gas is 
comparable to the annual gas consumption of the Czech Republic. 
While import dependence in the EU remains high, Russia may be more dependent on export 
revenues from its gas than the EU is on gas imports from Russia. Some 53% of Russian gas 
exports go to the EU worth an estimated $24 billion (€17 billion). Gazprom and the Russian 
state budget are thus highly dependent on exports to the EU and further supply disruption 
could lead to increasing efforts by EU member states to replace Russian gas with other 
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alternatives. While it would certainly be difficult for the EU to completely replace Russian 
gas in the short-term, it could at least partly replace gas from Russia with Algerian, Qatari or 
Nigerian LNG (re)diverted to EU terminals (albeit with a significant price tag1), as well as 
with piped gas from Norway, which still has capacities to increase exports to the EU. 
Furthermore, coal and (domestic) lignite could substitute gas in electricity generation at least 
in the short-term. In the longer run, there is scope for increased LNG reception capacity that 
could be built, having in mind that the US is currently contemplating investment in LNG 
export facilities. If Russia were further to escalate geo-political tensions over Ukraine, the 
prospect of the EU and US making a concerted response of this kind would become an 
obvious matter for consideration, even if such investments would be very costly and take 
many years to implement. From the Russia standpoint, however, if the Kremlin actually 
provoked such investments, it would gravely undermine their economy’s primary asset. 
Russia, on the other hand, cannot easily diversify its export routes away from the EU. 
Contrary to oil, gas is not a global commodity and is mainly shipped by pipelines. The bulk 
of Russia’s export capacities for gas is targeted at the EU market. As major supply routes to 
Asia are non-existent, a redirection of Russian gas exports to other markets in the short to 
medium term is impossible. This may give the EU an economic lever over Russia which 
could be used should relations with Russia deteriorate further.  
EU is better prepared to deal with interruptions to Ukraine gas transit 
Similar to 2009, potential disruptions could occur again if Russia were to interrupt deliveries 
to Ukraine for political reasons and/or because of Ukraine’s debts with Gazprom, which 
reportedly have reached almost $2 billion (€1.4 billion). In addition, interruptions of 
deliveries to the EU could occur in the worst case, if war breaks out over the Crimean 
peninsula. Although the Ukrainian gas transmission system remains the main route for 
Russian gas flowing into the EU, even if Russian supplies transiting this gas corridor were to 
be stopped completely, the 2009 scenario is unlikely to be reproduced. 
For one, Europe is coming out of a comparatively mild winter where lower heating demand 
has left gas storage levels around Europe at just below 50%. While storage capacity is 
unequally distributed across EU member states, this renders the EU less vulnerable to supply 
shocks in the short term, in particular as Europe enters the warmer seasons characterised by 
lower gas demand.  
Furthermore, in the face of changing global gas markets and partly also as a response to past 
supply disruptions, the EU internal gas market has further integrated since 2009 and is now 
better equipped to face external shocks. In particular, additional gas interconnectors, reverse 
flow capacities2, storage sites3 and LNG facilities4 have already and will further enhance the 
security of EU gas supplies. Yet, some regions remain more vulnerable than others, in 
particular the Baltic member states, which are entirely dependent on imports from Russia 
                                                   
1 In 2012, prices of LNG sold on the Japanese market were of roughly $16.75/Btu, whereas at the 
German border, the average price of imported gas was of $11.03/Btu (BP, 2013). 
2 According to the EU Regulation on Gas Supply Security (No 994/2010 ), all gas interconnectors between the 
member states should be equipped with reverse flow capabilities by the end of 2014 (European Parliament, 2010). 
3 Between January 2010 and January 2013, 12 storage facilities of a total maximum working volume of 
13,060 m3 have been deployed throughout the EU (Eurogas, 2010 and 2013).  
4 Between January 2009 and July 2013, six LNG terminals of a total capacity of 55 bcm have been deployed 
throughout the EU (GIE, 2013). A number of other facilities are currently under construction such as the LNG 
terminals in Swinoujscie (Poland, up to 5 bcm/year) or Klaipeda (Lithuania, up to 4 bcm/year).  
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and not connected to the EU pipeline network. However, the gas markets of these 
regions/member states are relatively small (see Figure 1). If put together, the total 
consumption of Bulgaria, Sweden, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia amounts to 12.2 
bcm, i.e. roughly 16% of the German gas demand.  
Figure 1. Russian gas in the total gas consumption of the EU-28 (aggregated 2012 data)  
 
Sources: BP (2013), EIA (2013 and 2014).  
What may be more important, however, is the declining importance of Ukraine as a transit 
country for Russian gas exports over the past decade. While in 2009 some 80% of Russian 
exports to the EU passed through Ukraine, this share has decreased to less than 50% by 
today. One of the key reasons for this is the addition of 55 bcm of direct transport capacity 
between Russia and Germany provided by the Nord Stream pipeline, which became fully 
operational in 2012. This means that less than 12% of total EU gas consumption today 
remains dependent on Ukraine transit routes. Short-term partial disruptions of transit 
activities are thus likely to be of an order of magnitude that can be compensated by other 
supply routes or suppliers. In this respect, it should also be noted that both Nord Stream and 
the Yamal pipelines, with a combined maximum capacity of 88 bcm, currently have 
substantial unused spare capacity. 
In any case, with transit infrastructure remaining intact, a disruption of gas supplies 
imported through Ukraine is likely to be of a temporary nature, given the size of the 
Ukrainian gas market, the high gas prices that Gazprom charges Naftogas and the resulting 
large revenues from gas exports to Ukraine. With Ukraine being the second largest export 
market for Russian gas, similar to the size of Germany (around 30 bcm per year), supply 
disruptions would have severe financial consequences for Gazprom. Worse than that, 
Russia’s credibility as a reliable gas supplier is (further – after 2009) at stake if any such 
measures should lead to a reduction of deliveries to the EU.  
At the present time it is impossible to know how far Russia intends to go over Ukraine, over 
both Crimea and Eastern mainland Ukraine. In any case, however, even in the worst 
hypotheses, it is evident that gas has been losing its edge as a geo-political weapon for 
Russia. 
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